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Abstract—In this paper, we develop and apply a framework to
characterize network equilibrium traffic and charge patterns in
an electric transportation network, mainly focused on the effect
of heterogeneities in charging prices across different charging
stations. Furthermore, we design optimal charging station prices
that can jointly manage societal congestion and electricity costs.
Our framework explores the effect of cost-minimizing users
preferring different charging stations based on their charge
amount and the charging stations’ energy prices, and how
this endogenous energy vs. route choice connection defines
the threshold-based structure of flows at Wardrop equilibria.
We discuss the uniqueness properties of the equilibria and
showcase how first-best marginal cost-based pricing can enforce
the socially optimal travel and charge behavior in the network,
but only under certain charging station congestion models.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recharging a plug-in battery Electric Vehicle (EV) takes
significantly more time that refueling an Internal Combustion
Engine Vehicle (ICEV). Hence, congestion at charging sta-
tions is emerging as a major issue, especially in urban areas
with large EV populations. As the travel range of EVs keeps
increasing, “charge rage” due to long wait times at charging
stations is gradually replacing range anxiety in EV users [1].
To address this issue, there is a clear need for new traffic
assignment methods that consider the effect of pricing strate-
gies (or other forms of congestion control schemes) employed
at charging stations on their traffic pattern. Pricing strategies
can also help manage the effect of EV charging load on
the power grid. It is clear that value of time, heterogeneous
charging prices, and mobility patterns/needs play central roles
in how users choose to charge at different charging stations,
as users consider a trade-off between energy costs and time
spent en route or waiting to find a free Electric Vehicle
Supply Equipment (EVSE) at a charging station.
In this paper, we aim to capture how individual users’
charging decisions affect aggregate congestion and elec-
tricity costs by studying the so-called Traffic and Charge
Assignment Problem (TCAP). We will study the special
threshold-based structure of network flows at equilibrium due
to the effect of charging prices on users’ path decisions.
Our user-equilibrium model of traffic assignment allows
us to characterize the uniqueness properties of the traffic
and charge equilibrium model under certain conditions. Our
Socially-Optimal (SO) traffic and charge assignment model
allows us to design mobility-aware charging fees that would
jointly reduce wait times at charging stations and control
the impact of the vehicles on the electricity distribution
network. The charging fees that we propose are a form of
congestion pricing, which has been studied extensively in
multi-commodity flow networks [2], [3] and more specifically
for optimal toll design in transportation networks [4].
Prior Art: A number of papers have considered the EV
charging station control problem as admission control prob-
lem in a queuing network, with queue stability and uniform
station utilization as the main goal, see, e.g., [5], [6], [7],
[8], [9]. Variations in electricity prices across stations are
not considered. In [10], the authors consider two service
types at a charging station, mathematically modeled as two
queueing systems. Another relevant line of work is focused
on developing routing and charging models for individual ve-
hicles, considering energy constraints. For example, in [11],
the authors study the routing problem of electric vehicles to
increase the driving range based on traffic conditions while
considering electric vehicles’ battery storage. In [12], the
authors study the problem of online charging and routing
for individual EVs who aim to minimize their travel cost. A
series of past works study the problem of optimally placing
charging infrastructure in an electric transportation network.
For example, in [13], the authors optimize the location of
charging lanes to minimize the social cost. Additionally, in
[14], [15], the authors consider the problem of deploying
charging stations in transportation networks in order to mini-
mize the travel cost of EV users. Finally, several authors have
considered the effect of electric vehicles on equilibrium traf-
fic patterns. For example, in [16], [17] and [18], the authors
study a mixed flow of battery electric vehicles and gasoline
vehicles and their effects on network equilibrium. However,
charging station pricing mechanisms and or the effects of
charging station demands on network equilibrium are not
considered. In [19], the authors study the path-constrained
traffic assignment problem considering the driving range of
electric vehicles. They model the driving range of users based
on their battery capacity, which is random for each user. In
[20], the authors study the equilibrium models for a network
of electric vehicles considering recharging time and driving
range. In their model, they assume all the charging stations
have the same unit price of electricity for all users, i.e., the
effect of charging prices on users’ decisions is not considered.
Synopsis: The remaining sections are organized as follows.
In Section II, we present the basic elements of our electric
transportation and charging network model. In Section III,
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2we present the cost model for individual users who aim to
minimize their travel and charging costs. In Section IV, we
present a threshold based energy cost-versus-time equilibrium
model for electric transportation and charging networks.
Section V discusses the SO assignment problem. Finally,
Section VI contains our numerical experiment.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multi-commodity network characterized by
EV users that are traveling between different origin and
destination pairs and would like to charge their vehicles en-
route at public charging stations. We model the transportation
network as a connected digraph G = (V,A), where V is
the set of nodes, A is the set of road arcs, and a subset of
nodes J ⊂ V contain charging facilities that EV users may
enter. Assuming that the population of EV users is large, each
individual EV user carries an infinitesimal amount of traffic
and energy demand. Furthermore, we assume the population
is homogeneous in their value of time. We will denote their
time value of money as α.
A. Individual EV User Characteristics
Each EV user in the network is associated with an origin-
destination (OD) pair (o, d) ∈ O and a charge requirement
of  units of energy.
1) Origin-destination (OD) pair: The charging needs of
each EV user originates at a source node o ∈ V and must be
fulfilled en route to a destination d ∈ V . Note that the origin
of the charging trip might not necessarily coincide with the
node from which the user starts their travel. It is simply the
location as which the user decides to charge while traveling.
2) Energy request : In modeling the energy needs of the
EVs, we make two important assumptions. First, we assume
each EV user has an inelastic energy demand, i.e., the energy
demand is not a function of charging station prices. Second,
we assume that this charging demand is the same irrespective
of the charging station j ∈ J that the user chooses for
charging. This means that an EV user’s energy need does
not change significantly in a single trip. We note that the first
assumption is not critical, as elasticity of energy demand as
a function of charging station prices can be included in our
model through the use of elastic demand functions, which we
refrain from due to brevity. However, the second assumption
is critical to the tractability of our model and allows us
to characterize the structural properties of equilibrium for
charging demand. While we acknowledge that our simplified
model does not fully capture the mobility constraints of
individual EVs, we believe that, at the macro scale, this
approach is sufficiently realistic for the purposes of price
design for congestion management in public charging station
networks, which should only be concerned with aggregate
statistics. For example, in urban areas, travel ranges for BEVs
now average above 100 miles, while the average single-trip
distance is merely 5.95 miles [21].
B. Charging Network Operator (CNO)
The Charging Network Operator (CNO) is the entity that
is in charge of designing the prices that manage congestion
and electricity usage at the charging stations. While the
characteristics of each individual EV user are private and
unknown to the CNO, we assume that the CNO has some
degree of knowledge of the mobility patterns and energy
requests of EV users based on statistics collected on the
transportation network. Specifically, we assume that the CNO
has access to the following information:
• Mobility Patterns of EV users: We model the trip rate of
EV users between OD pair (o, d) according to a Poisson
process with mean rate qod, which is known to the CNO,
and is considered inelastic.
• Statistics of Charge Requests: In this study, battery
charge demand of each EV is treated as a continuous
random variable that varies across the population of
EVs that travel between the same OD pair. We model
the energy request of each EV user as an i.i.d. random
variable E distributed according to a general distribution
gE(). Denote the minimum and maximum possible
energy requests for an individual EV as min and max.
Without loss of generality, and purely for brevity of
notation, we assume that gE() does not vary between
different OD pairs, and that it is bounded below away
from zero in its compact support [min, max].
C. Charging Stations
Public charging stations are located at a limited number of
nodes j ∈ J across the network. Without loss of generality,
we assume that all stations can provide similar charging
rates of 1/γ units of energy per unit time1. Each station
can be equipped with behind-the-meter solar generation that
can be used to serve EV charging demand. Any excess
charging demand is served from the grid, and is billed
at the appropriate locational rate to the CNO. Due to the
limited number of EV supply equipment (EVSE) available
at each station, which limits the number of EVs that can
be simultaneously plugged in at each station, the limited
charging rate of each EVSE, as well as potential activities
that the drivers may undertake while their EV is parked and
charging, congestion can occur at charging stations. For now,
we assume congestion to be a function of average number
of charging requests arriving at the station (denoted by λj),
leading to a expected cost Tj(λj) associated with finding a
free EVSE at the station j. Information about expected search
times is known to individual users. We assume that Tj(λj) is
a strictly increasing and continuously differentiable function.
In Section IV-D, we will discuss the implications of using
other forms of queueing based models for charging stations.
1Mathematically, the effect of different charging rates on the user equi-
librium can be captured by adding the term α−1γj to each station’s price
of electricity. Hence, the additional time spent waiting for charge acts as
a penalty for charging stations with lower charging rates, and more so for
vehicles with larger charging demand.
3Note that the availability of expected wait times but not
dynamic wait time information is key in this work. Given
this information, individuals choose the minimum expected
cost path that would allow them to travel to their destination
and charge en route, which we discuss next.
III. THE INDIVIDUAL USER DECISION PROBLEM
For an EV user with OD pair (o, d), an acyclic path p ∈ P
on the transportation network G is feasible if it connects
nodes o and d via a number of consecutive road arcs and
enters a single charging station j ∈ J located at a node on
path p. We define Pod ⊂ P as the set of feasible paths for OD
pair (o, d), and denote |Pod| as Kod. Note that if all charging
stations are not available to all users traveling between an OD
pair, we need to consider them under separate classes.
A. User Costs
Each EV user’s goal is to choose the path p ∈ Pod that
minimizes their expected trip costs, which consists of travel
time costs, wait costs at charging stations to find a free EVSE
and for the vehicle to be charged, as well as monetary costs
due to charging fees collected by the CNO. We discuss these
cost components next.
1) Latency Costs on Road Arcs: To preserve simplicity
of exposition, we assume that each road arc a ∈ A has a
constant latency ta > 0 that is independent of the mean
flow rate xa of users on that road arc. This is a reasonable
assumption provided that the flow of EVs is small relative
to the flow of other vehicles on the network, which is the
case in transportation systems at the time of this writing
[22]. However, we should note that, should the need arise,
the results in this paper can be readily extended to handle
separable cost functions for road arcs.
2) Latency Costs at Charging Stations: The expected
waiting times for finding an empty charging spot at charging
stations, Tj(λj), is considered as known for each user. Hence,
for each user, the average sojourn time of an EV user with
energy request  at any charging station j ∈ J is the sum of
the charging time γ and the average waiting time:
average sojourn time = γ+ Tj(λj). (1)
Given a congestion λ at charging stations, the mean latency
of any path pi ∈ P is the sum of the travel times along road
arcs and the average sojourn times at charging stations:
lpi(λ) =
∑
a∈A
δaita +
∑
j∈J
δji(γ+ Tj(λj)). (2)
3) Cost of Charging: For each usage at charging station
j ∈ J , we assume that EV users will pay a one time plug-in
fee τj , along with an electricity price υj for each unit of
charge that is purchased. The payment for an EV user with
demand  at charging station j is then:
payment at charging station j = υj+ τj . (3)
We provide more specifics on the objectives of the CNO and
how the CNO would select τj and υj in subsequent sections.
B. The Shortest Path Problem
Our key behavioral assumption is that each individual EV
user with OD pair (o, d) and energy demand  would solve
for the path pi ∈ Pod with the smallest expected total cost:
Cpiod() =
∑
a∈A
δaita +
∑
j∈J
δji(γ+ Tj(λj))

+ α
∑
j∈J
δji(τj + υj). (4)
This path choice model is the underlying framework for the
development of a traffic assignment model that explicitly
considers users with heterogeneous energy needs and how
their decisions affects the overall congestion in a Wardropian
equilibrium [23]. The important observation is that even for
users within the same OD pair that choose the same path
and enter the same charging station, travel costs could be
different, since each individual EV has a unique energy need.
IV. NETWORK EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
Recall our previous assumption that energy requests are
iid distributed for any OD pair according to a distribution
function gE(). Note from (4) that for any EV user traveling
between OD pair (o, d), the total cost of a path pi ∈ Pod
varies depending on the energy request . Informally put,
we will see that the dependence of the individual’s costs
on their energy requirement  determines the structure of
the equilibrium. A user with higher energy needs would
travel further for cheaper charging prices, whereas someone
with low charge requirements would rather charge at a
nearby station with potentially higher prices. Accordingly,
the path flows are not invariant within the population of users
traveling between the same OD pair, and the distribution of
charging amounts at each station does not coincide with the
network level charge distribution gE(). Instead, we will see
that, for each OD pair, the span of potential energy values
[min, max] can be partitioned into intervals such that, within
each interval, the OD pair flow is assigned to a unique
path. The reader should note that this structure naturally
has similarities to that of the Wardrop equilibrium of non-
electric heterogeneous travellers with a continuous value of
time distribution [24], [25].
A. The Set of Feasible Flows
Let f iod ∈ [0,∞) be the average flow rate of EV users of
OD pair (o, d) traveling on the i-th path pi ∈ Pod, such that
qod =
∑Kod
i=1 f
i
od. We define f = [f
i
od]∀(o,d)∈O,i=1,...,Kod as
the column vector of flows for all combinations of EV user
types and paths. The conservation of flow constraints apply
to the arrival rate of users at charging stations as well as arc
flow rates. Accordingly, the mean arrival rate of EV users at
any charging station j ∈ J satisfies:
λj =
∑
(o,d)∈O
Kod∑
i=1
δjif
i
od, (5)
4where δji = 1 if path pi enters charging station j and is
zero otherwise. Similarly, we define the mean flow rate of
EV users on any road arc a ∈ A as:
xa =
∑
(o,d)∈O
Kod∑
i=1
δaif
i
od, (6)
where δai = 1 if arc a is on path pi and is zero otherwise.
B. A Threshold-Based Wardropian Equilibrium Structure
In this section, we characterize the structure of the Wardrop
equilibria. Following the classical definition of Wardrop’s
first principle (or the extension proposed by Holden [26]),
we know that, at the state of equilibrium, for each OD pair,
no trip-maker can decrease their experienced trip cost with
respect to their own energy requirement  by unilaterally
changing paths.
For notational convenience, let us denote the electricity
price at the station on path pi ∈ Pod as θiod, i.e.,
θiod =
∑
j∈J
δjiυj . (7)
Furthermore, we assume that the paths in Pod are indexed
such that their electricity prices θiod are in a decreasing order,
i.e., for all paths pi and pi+1 in Pod, we have θiod ≥ θi+1od .
Lemma IV.1. If a path flow pattern f satisfies Wardrop’s first
principle, for each two alternative paths pi and pk connecting
one OD pair (o, d) such that i ≤ k, the energy requirement
 of any user (if any at all) traveling on path pi is less than
or equal to the energy requirement ′ of any user (if any at
all) traveling on path pk.
Proof. For any user traveling on path i, we know that at
equilibrium, we must have αθiod+ lpi(λ) +α
∑
j∈J δjiτj ≤
αθkod+ lpk(λ) + α
∑
j∈J δjkτj . On the other hand, for any
user traveling on path k, αθiod
′ + lpi(λ) + α
∑
j∈J δjkτj ≥
αθkod
′ + lpk(λ) + α
∑
j∈J δjkτj . Accordingly, as we know
that θiod ≥ θkod, we must have − ′ ≤ 0.
Given this observation, the next theorem characterizes the
structure of flows at equilibrium as a function of energy
thresholds for each OD pair (see Fig. 1), which will be
useful in finding the equilibrium as the solution of a non-
linear program.
Theorem IV.2. The equilibrium traffic pattern fod =
[f iod]i=1,...,Kod for each OD pair (o, d) is charac-
terized by a vector of energy thresholds piod =
(pi0od, pi
1
od, . . . , pi
Kod−1
od , pi
Kod
od ), where pi
0
od = min and
piKodod = max. All customers with pi
i−1
od ≤  ≤ piiod will
choose path pi. Moreover, for any used paths pi and pi+1,
piiod =
ψi+1od − ψiod
α(θiod − θi+1od )
, (8)
Proportion of travelers  
that choose path i 
Energy demand
Fig. 1: PDF of energy demand for travelers
where for path pi in pair (o,d),
Cpiod() = ψ
i
od + αθ
i
od, (9)
ψiod =
∑
a∈A
δaita +
∑
j∈J
δji(γ+ Tj(λj)) + α
∑
j∈J
δjiτj
(10)
and the vector piod characterizes the flow on each path pi in
(o, d) by:
f iod = qod
(∫ piiod
pii−1od
gE(x)dx
)
. (11)
For any unused path i+ 1, piiod = pi
i+1
od .
Proof. First, we prove that if the specific threshold-based
traffic pattern specified by (8) is established, we have equi-
librium. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose this flow
pattern that is not an equilibrium. This means that there will
exist a user with energy demand ′ assigned to path pi+1
(piiod ≤ ′ ) who has incentive to change his or her path to
pk (without loss of generality we assume k < i+ 1). We use
induction on k to show contradiction. For the user to prefer
path k = i, we must have Cpiod(
′) < Cpi+1od (
′), i.e.,
ψiod + αθ
i
od
′ < ψi+1od + αθ
i+1
od 
′ ⇒
′ <
ψi+1od − ψiod
α(θiod − θi+1od )
= piiod (12)
which is contradictory to piiod ≤ ′. Now, let us assume that
the claim holds for all paths pk+1, pk+2, . . . , pi, which mean
that we must have
ψi+1od − ψk+1od
α(θk+1od − θi+1od )
<
ψi+1od − ψiod
α(θiod − θi+1od )
⇒ (13)
αθiod(ψ
i+1
od − ψk+1od ) <
(
αθk+1od (ψ
i+1
od − ψiod)−
αθi+1od (ψ
k+1
od − ψiod)
)
. (14)
This means that for used path pk, we should have:
piiod ≤ ′ <
ψi+1od − ψkod
α(θkod − θi+1od )
. (15)
5However, given that pikod ≤ piiod by definition, we have:
ψk+1od − ψkod
α(θkod − θk+1od )
<
ψi+1od − ψiod
α(θiod − θi+1od )
⇒
αθiod(ψ
k+1
od − ψkod)− αθi+1od (ψi+1od − ψkod)−
αθi+1od (ψ
k+1
od − ψiod) + αθk+1od (ψi+1od − ψiod) <
α(θkod − θi+1od )(ψi+1od − ψiod). (16)
If we use (14), we can write:
ψi+1od − ψkod
α(θkod − θi+1od )
<
ψi+1od − ψiod
α(θiod − θi+1od )
= piiod (17)
which is contradictory to (15). Hence no user will have
incentive to change his or her path if the specific threshold-
based traffic pattern by (8) is established.
To prove the reverse, we can see that it easily follows from
Lemma IV.1 that only threshold based flows can exist at equi-
librium. Hence, we only need to prove that no other threshold
based flow except for that described by (8) can be an
equilibrium pattern. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose,
there exists another set of thresholds (β0od, . . . , β
i
od, . . . , β
K
od)
which is an equilibrium pattern. Therefore, users with energy
demand  ≤ βiod will choose path pi, and no user has
any incentive to change their path to path pi+1. Hence,
ψiod+αθ
i
od ≤ ψi+1od +αθi+1od  that leads to  ≤ piiod that means
βiod = pi
i
od which is contradictory to existence of another set
of thresholds that can be equilibrium pattern.
Corollary IV.2.1. At equilibrium, for any utilized paths pi
and pi+1, we must have:
Cpiod(pi
i
od) = C
pi+1
od (pi
i
od). (18)
Next we look at how we can determine these thresholds
and discuss the uniqueness properties of the equilibrium.
C. The UE Optimization Problem
In this section, we develop a nonlinear minimization
problem whose solution(s) satisfy the stated user equilibrium
conditions. Our approach is inspired by that of [24] in
characterizing UE flows for with a continuous value of
time distribution. First, we define some more notation for
threshold-based flow variables as shown in Table I.
TABLE I: Table of Notation
G() ,
∫ 
0 gE(x)dx The cumulative density function
of energy request  for (od) pair
G−1(t) , SUP{;G() < t}, the inverse function of
CDF of energy request 
E(x) ,
∫ x
0 G
−1(t)dt
f iod , The flow rate on path pi of (od) pair
Qiod ,
∑
j≤i f
j
od
The challenge in writing a convex program that character-
izes threshold-based UE and SO flows is working with the
non-linear threshold to flow mapping in (11). To deal with
this issue, inspired by [24], we define the value Q
i
od
qod
as the
percentile of population who are traveling between OD pair
(o, d) travel through paths p1 to pi. This new variable allows
us to write the thresholds piiod as G
−1(Q
i
od
qod
).
Given this connection, we are now ready to write a nonlin-
ear minimization problem whose global solution satisfies the
stated user equilibrium conditions stated in Theorem IV.2.
Theorem IV.3. The vector flow f is a user equilibrium traffic
pattern in the charging station network if and only if it solves
the following side-constrained traffic assignment problem:
minimize
f
∑
a∈A
xata + α
∑
j∈J
λjτj +
∑
j∈J
∫ λj
0
Tj(x)dx +
α
∑
(o,d)∈O
qod
(
Kod∑
i=1
θiod
[
E(
Qiod
qod
)− E(Q
i−1
od
qod
)
])
(19a)
subject to
∀a ∈ A : xa =
∑
(o,d)∈O
Kod∑
i=1
δaif
i
od, (19b)
∀j ∈ J : λj =
∑
(o,d)∈O
Kod∑
i=1
δjif
i
od, (19c)
∀(o, d) : qod =
Kod∑
i=1
f iod, (19d)
∀(o, d) ∀i : Qiod =
∑
k≤i
fkod, (19e)
∀(o, d) ∀i : f iod ≥ 0. (19f)
(19g)
Proof. We first state a lemma that slightly reformulates the
equilibrium conditions.
Lemma IV.4. The flow f is a user equilibrium traffic pattern
if and only if, it satisfies the following conditions:
1) ∀(o, d), j : f jod ≥ 0,
2) for every OD pair, for every utilized path i,l:
ψiod +
Kod−1∑
k=i
G−1(
Qkod
qod
)α
(
θkod − θk+1od
)
= ψlod +
Kod−1∑
k=l
G−1(
Qkod
qod
)α
(
θkod − θk+1od
)
. (20)
Proof. Proof of the first condition is trivial. For the second
condition, we know from (8) that
Ψi+1od −Ψiod
α
(
θiod − θi+1od
) = G−1(Qiod
qod
). (21)
Therefore, for every utilized path i in pair (o,d):
Ψiod +
Kod−1∑
k=i
G−1(
Qkod
qod
)α
(
θkod − θk+1od
)
= ΨKodod , (22)
6which proves the second condition.
Let us now write the Lagrangian of (19) as follows:
Leq(f
i
od, Q
i
od, qod, v
i
od, zod) =∑
a∈A
xata + α
∑
j∈J
λjτj +
∑
j∈J
∫ λj
0
Tj(x)dx+
α
∑
(o,d)∈O
qod
(
Kod∑
i=1
θiod
[
E(
Qiod
qod
)− E(Q
i−1
od
qod
)
])
+
∑
(o,d)∈O
Kod∑
i=1
viod
Qiod −∑
k≤i
fkod
+ ∑
(o,d)∈O
zod
(
qod −
Kod∑
i=1
f iod
)
(23)
Partial derivative of (23) with respect to f iod and Q
i
od are as
follows:
∂Leq
∂f iod
= Ψiod −
Kod−1∑
k=i
vkod − zod (24)
∂Leq
∂Qiod
= α
(
θiod − θi+1od
)
G−1(
Qiod
qod
) + viod (25)
In equilibrium, for every two utilized path i, l we must have:
∂Leq
∂Qiod
=
∂Leq
∂Qlod
= 0, (26)
∂Leq
∂f iod
=
∂Leq
∂f lod
= 0, (27)
which are equivalent to the conditions put forth in Lemma
(IV.4), proving that the solution of (19) is the user equilibrium
traffic pattern of network.
Theorem (IV.5) considers conditions for the uniqueness of
the equilibrium flow and the thresholds.
Theorem IV.5. Under strictly increasing searching time
functions of the form Tj(λj) at all charging stations, the
equilibrium path flows as well as the thresholds, G−1(Qi/q),
are unique.
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
D. A note on modeling charging stations as queues
At first glace, it could seem that the ideal choice for
modeling the wait time Tj(λj) at charging stations is as
the average time spent waiting in a queueing system. For
example, one could have a wait time of the following form:
Tj(λj) =
λ/cµ
1− (λ/cµ) .
1
cµ
, (28)
where µ is the expected service time of each user in the
system, and c is the capacity of the charging station. The
key challenge with queueing-type models arises in how we
define µ, the expected service time of each user here. In
order for our previous model to hold, i.e., for Tj(λj) to be
simply a uni-variate, strictly-increasing and convex function
of λj , we have to assume that the expected service time
of the station, µ is a constant. This means that the expected
amount of energy required by the users at each station, which
is an endogenous parameter in our model and is a function
of users’ charging decisions, should not have a direct effect
on their average service times in the queueing system. This
is an appropriate model when users park and charge their
vehicle while performing an activity such as shopping or
dining. However, if this is not the case, and charging is the
sole purpose of the users for coming to the station, we would
need to make µ a function of the quantiles Qiod in order to
appropriately model the mapping between the pdf of service
times for that specific station and its average wait time. We
discuss the implications of adopting a model that can capture
this connection in this section.
Let us assume that 1/µ corresponds to the average charge
amount (given the constant rate of charge), and c denotes the
station’s capacity, e.g., number of chargers times their rate
of charge. The quantity ρ = λ/µ is the so called utilization
ratio of a charging station, and is essentially equivalent to the
expected charging demand of the station. Hence, as a first
step, we will derive an analytical mapping for the expected
electricity consumption of charging stations (a surrogate for
ρ here), as a function of the variables Qiod.
Lemma IV.6. The expected electricity consumption in charg-
ing station j is
( ∑
(o,d)∈O
qod
Kod∑
i=1
δij
[
E(
Qiod
qod
)−E(Q
i−1
od
qod
)
])
.
Proof. Note that since the demand qod for each type of
EV user is given by a Poisson process, it follows from
Theorem IV.2 that the mean arrival rate at any charging
station j ∈ J also forms a Poisson process with rate∑
(o,d)∈O qod
∑Kod
i=1 δijP[G−1(
Qi−1od
qod
) ≤ x ≤ G−1(Qiodqod )].
Hence, we can write that the average electricity consumption
in each charging station j by using the linearity of expectation
and using Wald’s equation as follows:∑
(o,d)∈O
qod
[Kod∑
i=1
δijP[G−1(
Qi−1od
qod
) ≤ x ≤ G−1(Q
i
od
qod
)]
(∫
xg
(
x|G−1(Q
i−1
od
qod
) ≤ x ≤ G−1(Q
i
od
qod
)
)
dx
)]
(29)
=
∑
(o,d)∈O
qod
Kod∑
i=1
δij
∫ G−1(Qiodqod )
G−1(
Q
i−1
od
qod
)
xg(x)dx, (30)
Then we use the substitutions l = G(x) or x = G−1(l), we
will have:∑
(o,d)∈O
qod
Kod∑
i=1
δij
∫ Qiod
qod
Q
i−1
od
qod
G−1(l)G−1
′
(l)g(G−1(l))dl, (31)
and using the derivative of inverse function rule, this yields:
∑
(o,d)∈O
qod
Kod∑
i=1
δij
∫ Qiod
qod
Q
i−1
od
qod
G−1(l)dl. (32)
7Therefore, the expected total electricity consumption in each
charging station j, denoted by Uj(Q), is given by:
Uj(Q) =
∑
(o,d)∈O
qod
Kod∑
i=1
δij
[
E(
Qiod
qod
)− E(Q
i−1
od
qod
)
]
. (33)
Equipped with this, we can now create a wait time resem-
bling the form presented in (28) by modifying the wait times
associated with finding a free EVSE at a charging station in
(4) with a function of the following form:
expected wait time =
1
c
.Tj
(
1
c
Uj(Q)
)
, (34)
where Tj(x) = x/(1− x) corresponds to the term λ/cµ1−(λ/cµ)
in (28), and  replaces 1/µ for each user.
While we remove the details for brevity, we can show that
the structure of the Wardrop equilibrium of the network given
this new wait time formula is still threshold based, and can
be characterized by replacing the term
∫ λj
0
Tj(x)dx in (19)
with
∫ 1
cUj(Q)
0
Tj(x)dx. This is straightforward to show given
the following lemma.
Lemma IV.7. The derivative of Uj(Q) with respect to the
upper and lower quantiles Qi−1od and Q
i
od of path i is
respectively equal to G−1(Q
i−1
od
qod
) and G−1(Q
i
od
qod
), the upper
and lower energy thresholds of path i.
However, while this all seems positive, the function Uj(Q)
is generally not convex in Q, leading to the following result.
Proposition IV.8. The traffic flow pattern in a threshold-
based EV equilibrium may not be unique in path flows when
adopting wait times of the form given in (34).
Accordingly, to preserve the uniqueness properties of
threshold-based traffic equilibria, we have decided to adopt
waiting times of the form Tj(λj). Next, we study the socially
optimal flow of each path, and we will derive the plug-in fees
to guide the equilibrium solution towards a socially optimal
traffic and energy footprint.
V. SOCIALLY OPTIMAL PATTERN
In the social optimal (SO) view, the CNO has the objective
to minimize the total latency and electricity cost occurred by
EV users over all the network. Therefore, the socially optimal
flow is the solution of following optimization:
minimize
f
∑
a∈A
xata +
∑
j∈J
λjTj(λj) + α
∑
j∈J
Dj
(
Uj(Q)
)
,
(35)
subject to (19b)− (19g), (36)
where D(.) is a strictly convex and continuously differen-
tiable electricity cost function for each charging station, and
is a function of the expected total energy consumption Uj(Q)
of that charging station, given by (33).
The CNO’s goal is to calculate the plug-in fees and
electricity prices for each charging station that drive the
equilibrium flow pattern to be equal to the SO pattern.
Proposition V.1. If the condition set forth in Theorem IV.5 is
satisfied (i.e., if the threshold-based equilibrium is unique),
there exists an anonymous charging station pricing scheme
that can enforce the system optimum flow.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. By comparing the KKT
conditions of (35) and (19) for used path pi, we must have:
∂Leq
∂f iod
=
∂Lso
∂f iod
⇒
∑
j∈J
δjiτj =
∑
j∈J
δjiλjT
′
j (λj) (37)
∂Leq
∂Qiod
=
∂Lso
∂Qiod
⇒
α
∑
j∈J
υj
∂Uj(Q)
∂Qiod
= α
∑
j∈J
∂Dj
(
Uj(Q)
)
∂Uj(Q)
(
∂Uj(Q)
∂Qiod
)
(38)
Accordingly, to derive charging station prices that induce the
system-optimal flow pattern as a UE, the CNO can simply
set the plug-in fee (τj) and the cost of electricity (υj) at
charging station j as follows:
τj = λjT
′
j (λj) (39)
υj =
∂Dj
(
Uj(Q)
)
∂Uj(Q)
. (40)
Next we show our result with the numerical simulation.
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
In this section, we study the Wardrop equilibrium and
social welfare of an electric transportation and charging
network, and showcase the effect of charging station plug-
in fees and prices in (39) and (40). For the transportation
network, we use the road map of the SF bay area from [27],
considering Tesla supercharger, Nema 14-50, and roadster
charging stations as shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: SF Bay area map with Tesla supercharger, Tesla Nema
14-50, and Tesla roadster charging station.
8We design a transportation network based on Fig. 2, where
we have three OD pairs, (o1, d1), (o2, d2), (o3, d3), and 6
charging stations, X1, . . . , X6, and all road arcs are consid-
ered bidirectional (as we do not include road congestion costs
in our model) . For each OD pair, we consider 4 different
paths that include a charging station stop. The network is
shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: Transportation network model of Fig. 2
We assume each road arc has a constant latency ta = 1.
Moreover, we choose the charging rate γ = 1, and time value
of money α = 5. We consider 24 time slots with varying
travel rates, and we solve separate static TACPs for each
time slot. Three separate days are simulated, and the average
number of travelers between each OD pair for each day is
shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4: Average number of travelers in each OD pair for each
day
The searching time function Tj(λj) to capture congestion
due to limited EVSEs available at each charging station was
chosen as:
Tj =
{
λj λj ≤ Xj ,
10λj o.w,
with Xj shown in Table (II).
Station index 1 2 3 4 5 6
Xj 12 10 15 10 8 12
υj 10 5 7 6 8 9
TABLE II: Charging station capacities Xj and electricity
prices υj (in c/kWh)
Moreover, we assume that energy demand of users takes
value from a uniform distribution from 0 to 80 kWh
(U [0, 80]). Therefore, the CDF will be G(x) = x80 , and
E(x) = x
2
160 . Given these parameters, we study the network
traffic pattern and energy consumption under two scenarios:
1) Wardrop equilibrium: Here we study the traffic and
charge pattern of the network under no form of marginal
pricing. In this case, we assume that the plug-in fees are
equal to zero, and the charging price at each station is
equal to the grid price, as shown in Table (II), which we
consider as exogenous parameters. The result of Theorem
IV.3 allows us to calculate the equilibrium traffic flow, and we
can calculate the average energy consumption of customers
in each charging station based as shown in Lemma IV.6.
2) Socially Optimal flow and electricity consumption:
The result of optimization (35)-(36) gives the socially op-
timal flow, and again we can calculate the average energy
consumption of customers in each charging station as shown
in Lemma IV.6. As we would like to capture the effect of
customers’ aggregate charging decisions on their electricity
costs, and we have taken grid prices as exogenous parame-
ters2, we assume some charging stations are equipped with
on-site (behind-the-meter) solar PV generation. Hence, we
consider the energy cost function Dj(.) for each charging
station j to be of the following form:
Dj(x) = ζj(x− sj(t)), (41)
where ζj(.) specifies the monetary cost of any electricity con-
sumption above the on-site solar generation amount available
at each charging station (which we assume is available for
free). We use solar data from [29] for September 2018.
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Fig. 5: Average energy consumption in both Wardrop equi-
librium and Socially optimal scenarios over three days.
To see the effect of our transportation-aware marginal
pricing of electricity, let us consider the average energy
consumption at station 4, under both Wardrop equilibrium
and Socially optimal scenarios. Figure 5 compares the av-
erage energy consumption under these scenarios against the
solar energy generation s4(t). In Wardrop equilibrium, users
have no information about the generated solar energy in
each charging station. Hence, their charging decisions does
2Note this is simply due to our set up, where the total charging load
is small. At larger scales, one could consider looking at joint pricing in
transportation and power systems, which we have studied in a previous
work [28].
9not take the availability of free solar energy into account.
However, as shown in Fig. 5, the flow of users under the SO
scenario is such that the demand at the charging station is
better aligned with the solar energy production.
Let us also look at EVSE search costs at charging stations.
We calculate
∑
j∈J λjTj(λj) as the search cost at charging
stations. For Wardrop equilibrium, the search cost peak is
equal to 2.3e+4, and its average is 6.07e+3. For the socially
optimal scenario, the search cost at the peak is 1.8e+4, and
in average is 5.76e+3. Additionally, for the latency cost on
roads we calculate
∑
a∈A xata. For Wardrop equilibrium the
latency cost at the peak is 991.27, and its average is 492.56.
For the socially optimal scenario the latency cost at the peak
is 781.2, and in average 484.41. Therefore, in the social
optimal scenario, users will encounter less waiting/drive time
at both charging stations and roads.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We defined the so called Traffic and Charge Assignment
Problem (TCAP) for EVs traveling a multi-commodity trans-
portation network and requiring charge at a fast charging sta-
tion en route. We studied the special threshold-based structure
of equilibrium flows due to variations in electricity prices
across different stations, and we discussed conditions under
which the Wardrop equilibrium is unique. This allows us to
design congestion and electricity prices for charging stations
that can drive the overall traffic and energy footprint of the
network towards that of the SO pattern. A further benefit
we would like to point out is that traffic assignment plays
an important role in the transportation planning process, and
the same would apply to charging station capacity planning
when considering mobility and energy costs jointly. Building
capacity under an already congested distribution system
feeder or in a neighborhood with no EV traffic would not be
wise. Our TCAP model can also help with these decisions.
On other other hand, we also observed that is not very
difficult to have multiple equilibria in electricity price-aware
EV routing once you generalize your model to consider
more realistic effects. Moreover, the threshold-based routing
models we observed also lead to non-convex programs for
determining the socially optimal flow pattern. Coupled with
the potential complications that could arise due to non-
homogeneous value of time from users, the limited range
of EVs, or elasticity of charging demand, intractability also
becomes a concern. As such, one could argue that allowing
geographical energy price discrimination in charging stations
might not necessarily be implementable under model-based
EV demand management. Staying in a energy price agnostic
regime where charging station prices simply vary solely in
terms of the plug-in cost could lead to more well-behaved
congestion pricing models (clearly at the cost of efficiency).
Alternatively, one could consider model-free learning-based
approaches or differentiated pricing schemes where optimal
pricing and routing schemes can be designed for the setting
where users cannot directly choose which station they can
charge their vehicle at. Instead, they specify their preferences
for charging (which will lead to different charging prices),
after which an operator directly assigns them to a station
nearby.
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VIII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem IV.5
Since the convex waiting time function, Tj(λj),
is strictly increasing with respect to λj , then
it is strictly convex. Accordingly, the term∑
a∈A xata + α
∑
j∈J λjτj +
∑
j∈J
∫ λj
0
Tj(x)dx is
continuously differentiable and strictly convex, As
α
∑
(o,d)∈O qod
(∑Kod
k=1 θ
k
od
[
E(
Qkod
qod
)− E(Q
k−1
od
qod
)
])
is
continuously differentiable, the strict convexity of the
objective function hinges on the convexity of the following
term: ∑
(o,d)∈O
(
qod
Kod∑
k=1
θkod
[
E(
Qkod
qod
)− E(Q
k−1
od
qod
)
])
, (42)
where we define Q0od = 0 and Q
Kod
od = 1. We prove the
convexity of (42) over each single O-D pair, i.e., we consider
the convexity of functions of the following form:
aod(f) =q
K∑
k=1
θk
[
E(
Qk
q
)− E(Q
k−1
q
)
]
= (43)
q
(
E(1)θK +
K−1∑
k=1
(θk − θk+1)E(Q
k
q
)
)
. (44)
We will take the first and the second order derivative of (44)
with respect to f i. First order partial derivatives of (44) with
respect to Qi (i = 1, . . . ,K − 1) are as follows:
∂aod(f)
∂Qi
= (θi − θi+1)G−1(Q
i
q
), (45)
We can calculate the derivative of (44) with respect to f i as
follows:
∂aod(f)
∂f i
=
K−1∑
k=1
∂aod(f)
∂Qk
· ∂Q
k
∂f i
(46)
=
K−1∑
k=1
(θk − θk+1)G−1(Q
k
q
)Γki, (47)
where ∂Q
k
∂fi = Γki, with Γki given by:
Γki =
{
1 i ≤ k
0 o.w
Then, we calculate the second order derivative of (44):
∂2
∂f i∂f l
aod(f) =
K−1∑
k=1
[
(θk − θk+1)(yk(f)
q
)ΓkiΓkl
]
, (48)
where yi(f) is:
yi(f) =
∂G−1(Qi/q)
∂Qi
. (49)
For proving the convexity, we will show the Hessian of (44)
is non-negative with respect to f , i.e., we consider the non-
negativity of:∑
i,l
∂2
∂f if l
aod(f)h
ihl =
∑
i,l
K−1∑
k=1
[
(θk − θk+1)
(
yk(f)
q
)ΓkiΓklh
ihl
]
=
K−1∑
k=1
[
(θk − θk+1)(yk(f)
q
)
(∑
i,l
ΓkiΓklh
ihl
)]
=
K−1∑
k=1
[
(θk − θk+1)(yk(f)
q
)
(∑
i
Γklh
i
)2]
. (50)
The coefficients (θk − θk+1)(yk(f)/q) are non-negative,
since yi(f) =
∂G−1(Qi/q)
∂Qi is the derivative of the inverse
of an increasing function (the cumulative density function)
and prices are in decreasing order (θk ≥ θk+1), therefore,
those coefficients are non-decreasing. The non-negativeness
of Hessian of (44) with respect to f i proves the convexity
of (44). Summing over all O-D pairs will prove the con-
vexity of (42). Therefore, because the waiting time function,
Tj(λj), is strictly increasing, the optimization problem (19)
is strictly convex, and hence has a unique solution. Thus, the
equilibrium pattern as well as energy thresholds are unique.
